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Protections for Corporate Shareholders:
Are Major Revisions Needed?*
DAVID S. RUDER**
The author comments on various proposals for change in
corporate law and governance. He reviews current state and
federal laws and regulations. Finding the present system of
regulation to be optimal, the author concludes that changes are
unnecessary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 21, 1982, the membership of the American Law Insti-
tute ("ALI"), an organization normally concerned with producing
* This article is based upon a presentation made at the Eighth Annual Baron de Hirsch
Meyer Lecture Series, University of Miami School of Law, March 4, 1983. That presentation
in turn was based upon a paper prepared for presentation at the Ray Garrett, Jr., Corporate
and Securities Law Institute, sponsored by Northwestern University School of Law, May
1981. This article is descriptive in nature and does not purport to provide the sources
necessary for deep research.
** Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
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restatements of the law, was asked to consider Tentative Draft No.
1 of a document entitled Principles of Corporate Governance and
Structure: Restatement and Recommendations.1 That draft cre-
ated widespread controversy. The Reporters are revising the pro-
posals contained in Tentative Draft No. 1 and preparing another
proposal entitled "Duty of Loyalty,"' 2 which covers aspects of cor-
porate law not treated in Tentative Draft No. 1. Like the earlier
draft, the new draft will engender controversy and opposition.
Both drafts seem to be based upon the proposition that the
present law of corporations is unsatisfactory. In fact, the attitude
of the ALI Reporters seems to be that United States corporations
are not performing adequately, either for their shareholders or for
society. This premise has led the Reporters to propose major re-
forms in the corporate regulatory system. Their proposals include:
1. establishment of a category called "significant relation-
ship," which restricts the definition of directors having desirable
characteristics of independence for certain purposes;8
1. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Tentative Draft No. 1]. The members
of the ALI have not voted upon Tentative Draft No. 1. The contents of that document
represent only the opinions of the Reporters of the Draft.
2. [Editor's note-The duty of loyalty proposals appear in Tentative Draft No. 3. PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS pt. V (Tent. Draft No.
3, 1984). Tentative Draft No. 2 contains revised parts I, II, and III of Tentative Draft No. 1.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS pts. 1-111 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1984). These drafts have been prepared for the May 1984 ALI membership
meeting.]
3. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 1.24:
A director has a significant relationship with the senior executives ... of a
corporation if, as of the time of the annual meeting to elect directors:
(1) He is employed by the corporation, or was so employed
within the two preceding years;
(2) He is a member of the immediate family ... of an individ-
ual who is employed by the corporation as an officer ... or was em-
ployed by the corporation as a senior executive within the two pre-
ceding years;
(3) He owns an equity interest . in a business organization
... to which the corporation made, or from which the corporation
received, during either of the organization's two preceding fiscal
years, commercial payments ... which, when multiplied by his per-
centage equity interest in the organization, exceeded $200,000;
(4) He is a principal manager ... of a business organization to
which the corporation made, or from which the corporation received,
during either of the organization's two preceding fiscal years, com-
mercial payments that exceeded 5% of the organization's consoli-
dated gross revenues, or $200,000, whichever is more; or
(5) He is affiliated in a professional capacity with corporate
counsel . ..or with an investment-banking firm that has been re-
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2. permitting corporations to devote resources, within rea-
sonable limits, to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and
philanthropic purposes, "even if corporate profit and share-
holder gain are not . . . enhanced";'
3. for large publicly held corporations, urging a board com-
posed of a majority of independent directors and three indepen-
dent committees-audit, nominating, and compensation;5
4. codification and expansion of the well-recognized busi-
ness judgment rule, with an addition that would require direc-
tors to have "a rational basis" for their business judgments;6
5. extensive revision of longstanding principles associated
with derivative actions, providing more judicial control over dis-
missals and settlements;'
6. restatement and codification of fiduciary principles fall-
ing under the category "duty of loyalty."8
This article is descriptive in nature. It provides a survey of
protections for shareholders, highlighting areas that are sometimes
ignored by the corporate critics. In doing so, this article addresses
a question that the ALI Reporters do not explore adequately: Does
the present system of state and federal regulation of corporate in-
ternal affairs function well in the public interest? The fundamental
premise of the article is straightforward: The primary obligation of
corporate managers is the production of profits for the benefit of
shareholders in an efficient manner, with due regard to societal
needs. The conclusion is that the current system for regulating cor-
tained by the corporation, or acted as a managing underwriter in an
issue of the corporation's securities, within the two preceding years,
or was so affiliated with such a law or investment-banking firm when
it was so retained or so acted.
For purposes of (this section], the term "the corporation" includes any cor-
poration that controls. . . the corporation, and any subsidiary or other business
organization that is controlled by the corporation.
Id. (citations omitted).
4. Id. § 201:
Corporate law should provide that the objective of the business corporation
is to conduct business activities with a view to corporate profit and shareholder
gain, except that, even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby
enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business
(c) may devote resources, within reasonable limits, to public
welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. Id. §§ 3.03, 3.05-.07.
6. Id. § 4.01.
7. Id. pt. VII.
8. See supra note 2.
1983]
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porate internal affairs provides a well-balanced mixture of restric-
tions and freedom of action and therefore does not require major
revision.
II. SEPARATION OF POWER AMONG SHAREHOLDERS, DIRECTORS, AND
OFFICERS
A starting point for any meaningful analysis of corporate regu-
lation is the recognition that corporations are business entities. In
the rush to dissect the corporate form, it is possible to forget that
the modern corporation arose in response to the need of businesses
for risk capital. Two aspects of corporate utilization of capital are
important. First, the corporate form permits large numbers of in-
vestors to combine their resources in a single business entity, with
capital vastly exceeding the resources of one individual or a small
group. Companies in the automotive, energy, defense, aeronautical,
and mineral industries are obvious examples. Second, the corpo-
rate form offers limited liability, providing entrepreneurial risk-
takers with limits on the losses they may incur in business activity.
By establishing a ceiling for economic loss, the corporate form en-
courages risk-taking, thereby increasing possibilities for gain by
the individual and society.
Although aggregation of capital is an important reason for de-
velopment of the corporate form, the more important purpose is to
provide limited liability for enterpreneurs desirous of engaging in
risk enterprises. Limited liability is important for small corpora-
tions owned and managed by shareholders, and it is essential for
large corporations owned by shareholders who are merely passive
investors.
Although state incorporation laws regulate the conduct of a
corporation's internal affairs, these state laws are relatively uni-
form. This results, in part, from the Model Business Corporation
Act ("Model Act").' For over thirty years the Committee on Cor-
porate Laws of the American Bar Association's Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law 0 has engaged in continuous anal-
9. The Model Act currently is undergoing an extensive revision, including a renumber-
ing. Although this article primarily cites the 1979 version of the Model Act, it includes sec-
ondary citations to an exposure draft of the 1983 version of the Act. 1983 REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT (Exposure Draft, Mar. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Exposure Draft]. The
Committee on Corporate Laws has submitted the Exposure Draft to the American Bar As-
sociation's membership for comment.
10. Membership of the Committee on Corporate Laws includes active members of the
corporate bar, lawyers who represent plaintiffs in actions brought against corporations, and
[Vol. 37:243
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ysis and revision of the Model Act, which is a major point of
reference in the continuing revision of state corporation laws. More
than twenty-five states have adopted in substance the Model Act;
others have adopted portions of it. In addition, the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law" controls the internal affairs of many of this
country's largest corporations because they have chosen to incorpo-
rate in Delaware and to be governed by the Delaware statute. The
Model Act and the Delaware statute have created considerable
uniformity in the laws applicable to corporations in the United
States.
A similar general pattern regulating ownership and control of
corporations exists in virtually all states. The corporation, an arti-
ficial entity with limited liability, comes into existence by comply-
ing with the provisions of the state of incorporation and com-
mences its operation through the acts of "incorporators." The
statute of the state of incorporation, the corporation's articles of
incorporation, and its bylaws govern the corporation. Together,
these three documents define the powers vested in the sharehold-
ers, the directors, and the corporate officers.
At the inception of a corporation, shareholders possess the
power to adopt articles of incorporation and bylaws and to elect
directors. The shareholders retain the power to elect directors and
to vote on a limited number of matters regarded as fundamental to
the corporation, including amendment of the articles of incorpora-
tion and the bylaws, merger, sale of assets, and voluntary
dissolution.
The most significant aspect of the corporate form, other than
limited liability, is the fact that corporate statutes prevent share-
holders, who are the owners of the corporation, from managing the
ordinary affairs of the corporation. For example, section 35 of the
Model Act provides: "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or
under authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation
shall be managed under the direction of, a board of directors ex-
cept as may be otherwise provided in this Act or in the articles of
incorporation. ' 12 Similarly, section 141 of the Delaware General
law school professors. Committee members are drawn from all regions of the United States,
including the states Delaware, California, and New York, where intense scrutiny of corpo-
rate law occurs on a regular basis.
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (1983). The drafters of the Delaware General
Corporation Law have worked closely with the ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws. Many
Delaware provisions are similar to provisions of the Model Act.
12. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1979); see also Exposure Draft, supra note 9, §
1983]
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Corporation Law states: "The business and affairs of every corpo-
ration organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. '' 3
Management of the corporation is the responsibility of the board
of directors, not the shareholders.
The primary tasks of the board of directors are the establish-
ment of corporate policy, the appointment of operating officers,
and the review of corporate performance. In addition, the directors
exercise certain powers not afforded to shareholders and officers.
Only the board of directors may declare dividends, issue stock,
enter into extraordinary contracts, and recommend to the share-
holders fundamental changes in the corporation.
Although the board of directors manages the corporation's
business and affairs, it is the officers who carry on the daily opera-
tions of the corporation. The officers develop plans for long-term
operation of the corporation, which are usually presented to the
directors for approval. The officers also have authority to deal with
third parties on behalf of the corporation. There are two limita-
tions on the authority of corporate officers: 1) they may not bind
the corporation in extraordinary situations in which authority is
reserved to the directors, and 2) they may not, even with board
approval, accomplish fundamental changes requiring shareholder
approval.
This system of corporate governance permits corporate man-
agement to function without shareholder interference. Directors
and officers, not the shareholders, control corporate operations
during periods between elections of directors.
In the large corporation owned by many shareholders, separa-
tion of ownership from operational control reflects a statutory pol-
icy that the corporate enterprise will function better when profes-
sional business people are the managers. Business decisions require
professional expertise, and the law recognizes that professional
managers must have sufficient flexibility to meet changing condi-
tions without submitting each decision to a shareholder vote.
There are, however, certain restraints on managerial behavior. The
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983). An important exception to the rule that the
shareholders may not manage the corporation is in the "close corporation" provisions of the
various state statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1983). For instance,
under § 351 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, "[t]he certificate of incorporation of
a close corporation may provide that the business of the corporation shall be managed by
the stockholders of the corporation rather than by a board of directors." Id. § 351 (1983).
[Vol. 37:243
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managers are subject to scrutiny when elections for directors occur.
They are subject also to the discipline of the market, where poor
management usually results in lower share prices.
Despite significant differences between small and large corpo-
rations, significant analogies exist. Although in a small corporation
the same persons usually have both ownership and control, separa-
tion between the two frequently exist. For example, some owners
of new corporations may have no desire to manage, although they
wish to provide capital. In a maturing corporation, shares may
have been transferred to family members not interested in man-
agement. Exclusion of nonmanaging owners can also result when
one shareholder or -a group of shareholders owns sufficient stock to
control the corporation. Thus in both small and large corporations,
there may be "minority shareholders" who have no voice either in
the election of directors or in the operation of the corporation.
Control of a corporation means the ability to elect directors,
who in turn will appoint the corporate officers. Control of the vot-
ing process will determine who controls the corporation. A single
shareholder, or a group of shareholders acting together, may own a
majority of the shares and thus have the power to elect a majority
of the board. Control of a corporation may also result when no one
owns a majority of shares. In those situations, ownership of less
than fifty percent of the shares of a corporation will be sufficient to
ensure control. The phrase "minority shareholders" thus may in-
clude a majority of shareholders who are not members of the con-
trol group.
Many corporations are now so large that shareholder control is
no longer a meaningful concept. Writing in the 1930's, Professors
Berle and Means identified the fact that some corporations were so
large, and their ownership so diverse, that no single shareholder or
group of shareholders could control the corporation through stock
ownership.14 They observed that boards of directors control those
corporations by determining the identity of persons named as the
holders of powers of attorney in the proxies submitted by share-
holders. Their observations are correct today. Shareholders in large
corporations typically do not exercise independent judgment when
voting their shares. These shareholders usually will empower rep-
resentatives of management to cast their votes for them. Accord-
ingly, control of the proxy machinery means control of the corpora-
tion. It is in this sense that the concept of separation of ownership
14. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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from control is most clear. The shareholders consistently vote in
favor of management's nominees for directors, and they usually af-
firm management's suggestions for fundamental changes.
Many characterize the inability of shareholders in large corpo-
rations to influence the election of directors as a lack of "share-
holder democracy." Nevertheless, the inability of most sharehold-
ers to control the election of directors is similar in both large and
small corporations. In the largest corporations, persons owning an
extremely small amount of stock may exercise control. In small
corporations, only those owning a majority of shares are able to
exercise control.
Since the inability of shareholders to affect the daily opera-
tions of the corporation is inherent in the modern day corporate
structure, the separation of ownership from control in the largest
corporations raises problems differing only in degree from those of
smaller corporations. In all corporations, except those operated by
owner-managers, owners of the corporation have no power to scru-
tinize corporate managers on a day-to-day basis.
Given the absence of direct shareholder control in the contem-
porary corporation, the ability of a regulatory system to provide
other controls is crucial. The existing state and federal corporate
regulatory system provides these controls.
III. CORPORATE OBJECTIVES
Any effort to rationalize the regulation of corporate internal
affairs must identify the purpose of that regulation. As early as the
1930's, Professors Dodd and Berle engaged in a debate under the
topic "for whom are corporate managers trustees?"'15 Professor
Dodd asserted that managers of the corporation are "guardians of
all the interests which the corporation affects and not merely ser-
vants of its absentee owners."'16 Professor Berle considered corpo-
rate powers exercised by managers as powers held in trust for
shareholders and not for other persons affected by the corpora-
tion.'7 Although the debate over management objectives persists,8
15. Professor Berle initiated the debate in Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Berle, Corporate Powers]. For the reply,
see Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932). For
the rejoinder, see Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1932).
16. Dodd, supra note 15, at 1157.
17. Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 15, at 1049-50.
18. See, e.g., Address by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams, Fifth Annual Securities
[Vol. 37:243
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the law continues to hold corporate managers responsible to the
shareholders of the corporation and not to its employees, custom-
ers, or the general public.
The impact of large corporations on the economy cannot be
denied. Even small corporations may have extensive influence
within their communities. Nevertheless, a shift of corporate focus
from shareholder profits to the public interest would create
problems in regulating corporate internal affairs. I have stated my
views on this subject as follows:
Rejection of the profit motive as the guiding principle for
corporate behavior and substitution of the public interest carries
significant and extensive legal consequences. The traditional le-
gal notion that the corporate manager owes fiduciary obligations
to the shareholder-owners of the corporation is based on profit
maximization. Historically, the shareholder-owner has had the
power by means of a set of well developed legal rules to force the
corporate manager to account to him for the use of his property.
Corporate power exercised in the pursuit of profit for the benefit
of shareholders has been subject to the control established
through these developed legal rules. If the underlying profit the-
ory upon which these rules of control are based is discarded,
however, it is inevitable that a new set of rules will be estab-
lished which will be designed to control the exercise of corporate
power in the pursuit of public obligations. Consideration of
whether society wishes to discard an entire system of controls
based upon profit maximization for business must be accompa-
nied by consideration of what the new control rules will
contain. 19
Despite many statements that corporations have obligations to
the public, there is no legal theory justifying the use of corporate
resources solely in the public interest. This does not mean that the
absence of a theory should bar business activity designed to fulfill
public obligations. Corporate activities motivated by concern for
society can in the long run maximize corporate profits.
There are at least three categories of business activity that ful-
fill public obligations: "activity carried on in conformity with legis-
lative standards, activity carried on in response to government
pressure, and activity carried on in pursuit of community welfare
Regulation Institute, San Diego, California (week of Jan. 17, 1978), summarized in SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 437, at A22 (Jan. 25, 1978).
19. Ruder, Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213-14
(1965) (footnotes omitted).
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needs which also benefits the corporation." 0 If a corporation can
satisfy public obligations in a manner consistent with profit-max-
imization objectives, then the establishment of separate standards
for judging the activities of corporate directors and officers is un-
necessary. Their activities would simultaneously fulfill their obliga-
tions to the public and to the corporation and its shareholder-own-
ers. The ALI Reporters' emphasis on the use of corporate resources
without reference to "corporate profit and shareholder gain"21 ig-
nores the reality that profit maximization and activities in the
public interest are compatible.
IV. THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT PROTECTION FOR CORPORATE
INTERESTS
Considering the separation of ownership from control noted
above 2 and the corporation's ability to satisfy public obligations
while pursuing profit objectives, the corporate regulatory system
should and does concentrate on protecting shareholders. The pre-
sent system does so by 1) protecting shareholder voting rights; 2)
requiring corporate officers and directors to manage the corpora-
tion with care; 3) preventing conflict-of-interest transactions be-
tween the corporation and its directors and officers; and 4) safe-
guarding against overreaching by corporate officers, directors, and
controlling shareholders in securities transactions.
A. Protection of Shareholder Voting Rights
As noted earlier, 3 shareholders generally do not have the
power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. In-
stead, their power lies in their ability to vote for directors and to
vote for or against certain fundamental changes in the corporation,
such as mergers, sale of assets, dissolution, article amendments,
and authorization for additional shares.
Before examining the legal protections afforded shareholders
in the area of fundamental changes, it is important to note that
state corporate statutes, together with the corporation's articles of
incorporation and bylaws, constitute a contract between sharehold-
ers and their corporation. A unique aspect of the corporate con-
tract is its provisions for amendment. In adopting the articles and
20. Id. at 221.
21. See supra note 4.
22. See supra pp. 247-50.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
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bylaws, the shareholders agree that certain fundamental changes in
the corporation will require a specified percentage of votes. If a
proposal receives the required number of votes, the contemplated
action will occur despite the objection of some shareholders. The
partnership law concept of unanimous voting or veto over business
action is not a part of corporation law.24
1. PROXY VOTING
The most important aspect of shareholder voting is the right
of the shareholder to vote by proxy. Proxy voting allows sharehold-
ers to vote without requiring their presence at meetings. Instead,
shareholders may authorize agents to vote their shares for them.
Shareholders located far from a corporate meeting may protect
their voting rights by voting in absentia.
Although all states grant the right to vote by proxy, few states
regulate the solicitation of proxies. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act")2" addresses the gap in state regulation and
regulates proxy solicitations of larger corporations. 26 Section 1427 of
the Exchange Act gives the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") the power to promulgate rules regulating the solicitation
of proxies with respect to any security registered under section 1225
of the Act-i.e., any security listed on a national stock exchange or
any security of a company that has total assets exceeding $3 mil-
lion and is held of record by 500 or more persons.2
24. Shareholders of small corporations often agree to require unanimity in the election
of directors. Moreover, articles of incorporation or bylaws of a corporation of any size may
provide voting requirements that are greater than a majority, even up to 100%. The corpo-
rate form does not, however, lend itself well to these high voting requirements, because
minority vetoes have the effect of stifling corporate enterprise and initiative.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
26. See Exchange Act §§ 14(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (c) (1982).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982).
29. See Exchange Act § 12(a), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a), (g) (1982); SEC Rule 12g-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1983). Pursuant to § 14(a), the SEC has issued Regulation 14A, 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -12 (1983) (proxies solicitation; rules 14A-1 through 14a-12); Schedule
14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1983) (proxy-statement information); Schedule 14B, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-102 (1983) (information in statements filed by party other than issuer); Rule 14b-
1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (1983) (broker obligation to respond to proxy solicitation for securi-
ties held of record by broker); Regulation 14C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14c-1 to -7 (1983) (informa-
tion distribution for shareholder meetings in absence of proxy solicitations; rules 14c-1
through 14c-7); Schedule 14C, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-101 (1983) (information required under
regulation 14C). The federal proxy regulations do not completely fill the gap left by state
regulation, because they do not apply to corporations owned by less than 500 shareholders
(with certain exceptions) or having total assets that do not exceed $3 million.
1983]
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The federal proxy regulations are extremely broad. Anyone
soliciting votes must furnish shareholders with written proxy state-
ments containing information specified by the SEC.30 The regula-
tions dictate the form of proxy3 ' and the manner of presentation.2
Extensive provisions exist concerning the amount and type of in-
formation that must be included in the proxy material.33 In addi-
tion, proxy solicitation in a contested election triggers special rules
that apply to management or to others soliciting proxies. 4
One of the most important proxy rules is rule 14a-9" of the
Exchange Act. The rule provides that no solicitation may be made
by means of a communication that is false or misleading with re-
spect to any material fact or that fails to correct an earlier commu-
nication that has become false or misleading. This rule promotes
full disclosure in proxy solicitations. Rule 14a-9 has produced ex-
tensive litigation by both the SEC and by individuals asserting
that proxy solicitations contained misleading information.3 6
2. CUMULATIVE VOTING
Most states permit cumulative voting for directors. The typi-
cal statute provides that the number of votes each shareholder is
entitled to cast for the election of directors will be multiplied by
the number of directors to be elected, and that the shareholder
may cast all of his votes for a single director or may distribute his
votes among the nominees.3 7 Cumulative voting enables sharehold-
ers without a controlling block of the corporation's shares to elect
one or more directors, 8 thus permitting the minority shareholders
to elect at least one representative to the board of directors.
3. FINANCIAL INFORMATION
The federal securities laws ensure the availability of corporate
30. SEC Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1983).
31. SEC Rule 14a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (1983).
32. SEC Rule 14a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-5 (1983).
33. SEC Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1983); SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8 (1983); SEC Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1983).
34. SEC Rule 14a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1983); SEC Schedule 14B, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-102 (1983).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983).
36. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Corp. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
37. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1983).
38. For a discussion of cumulative voting, see Williams, Cumulative Voting, HARV. Bus.
REv., May-June 1955, at 108.
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financial information. Federal proxy rules require corporations
that register securities under section 12"9 of the Exchange Act to
send their shareholders an annual report containing certified
financial statements for at least the last two fiscal years of the cor-
poration.40 They must also file with the SEC annual and quarterly
reports containing financial information.41 The latter information
is available directly to shareholders upon request and reaches the
marketplace through analysis by professionals.
State law is increasingly providing similar protections for
smaller corporations. In 1978, an amendment42 of the Model Act
added the requirement that "[elach corporation shall furnish to its
shareholders annual financial statements, including at least a bal-
ance sheet as of the end of each fiscal year and a statement of
income for such fiscal year."' This provision was included because
federal law does not require small, closely held corporations whose
securities are not registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act
to send financial statements to shareholders."" Amendment of the
Model Act closed a gap in the federal regulatory system.'5
4. SHAREHOLDER NOMINATIONS
Despite the existence of a federal mechanism mandating ex-
tensive disclosure, shareholders seldom vote against management.4 6
Shareholders seem remarkably uninterested in seeking change
through the voting procedures, except for situations in which a
large and well-financed shareholder group owning substantial
shares in the corporation creates a contest.
Shareholder lethargy and management control of the proxy
39. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
40. SEC Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1983).
41. Exchange Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982); SEC Regulation 13A, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.13a-1 to -2, -10 to -13, -16 to -17 (1983).
42. See 34 Bus. LAW. 1616 (1979).
43. MODEL BUSINESS Coap. ACT § 52 (1979); see also Exposure Draft, supra note 9, §§
16.01-.04.
44. See Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Bus-
iness Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendment to Require Send-
ing Financial Statements to Shareholders, 33 Bus. LAW. 931, 932 (1978).
45. Most states give shareholders the right to examine the corporation's list of stock-
holders; in many jurisdictions the right includes the examination of books and records. Ex-
amination and copying of the stockholder list provides the possibility of changing the man-
agement of the corporation through voting procedures or purchase of shares. Also, the right
to examine books and records provides shareholders with information regarding the conduct
of the corporation's affairs and information pertinent to share valuation.
46. See supra pp. 249-50.
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apparatus in the large corporation often make the election of man-
agement's nominees a foregone conclusion, prompting the sugges-
tion that control of the director-nomination process should lie in
the hands of independent groups instead of with management. One
proposal would remove from the board of directors the right to
nominate candidates for election and would give that right to a
special committee of directors. Only independent directors, those
not employed by the corporation and having no direct or indirect
financial connection with the corporation, would compose the com-
mittee. 7 This change would transfer the nomination process and
the ultimate control of the corporation from the current manage-
ment group to an outside, independent group.48
These proposals for shareholder input into the nominating
process thus raise a question of great significance: Should the
board of directors have the opportunity to control the identity of
the nominees presented to the shareholders as "management"
nominees? This question affects the all-important concept of cor-
porate control. Control of the corporation will not shift if the
board of directors has the ultimate power to determine the identity
of those for whom proxies will be voted. Removal of the nominat-
ing power from the full board of directors in order to place it solely
in the hands of an independent nominating committee would re-
sult in taking corporate control away from corporate management.
The approach of the ALI Reporters is not so drastic. They
suggest that a nominating committee composed exclusively of in-
dependent directors should have the responsibility for recom-
mending candidates for the board.49 The Reporters' proposal al-
lows the board to submit its own nominees for elections, but it also
permits the nominating committee to list the names of its nomi-
nees in solicitation materials."0
Suggestions for change in the nomination process are probably
the most important made by those interested in corporate reform.
Although the board of directors is viewed by many as being re-
sponsible for the nomination process, in fact corporate chief execu-
tive officers ("CEO's") usually control director nominations. The
47. Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 5, 7,
126 CONG. REC. S3754, S3755 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1980). Compare the definitions of director
independence discussed in Ruder, Current Issues Between Corporations and Shareholders:
Private Sector Responses to Proposals for Federal Intervention into Corporate Govern-
ance, 36 Bus. LAw. 771, 776 (1981).
48. See Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, supra note 47.
49. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 3.06.
50. Id. § 3.06 comment d, at 103-04.
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rationale for this arrangement is a managerial philosophy that the
CEO cannot manage a highly complicated business if he does not
have the confidence of the board of directors. The board of direc-
tors is not only expected to support and counsel the CEO, but also
to monitor his performance and to discharge him when he manages
badly.
The premise that the corporation cannot function well if the
CEO and the board of directors constantly disagree seems sound.
Nevertheless, the presence of independent directors on the board
provides an important method for monitoring management."'
5. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
Despite state law reluctance to allow shareholder control of
corporate operations, federal proxy rules permit a limited amount
of shareholder input. Rule 14a-8,52 promulgated pursuant to the
Exchange Act, permits a shareholder to present proposals for cor-
porate action at shareholders' meetings. The rule requires manage-
ment to include shareholder proposals in its proxy statement but
permits omission of proposals under certain circumstances."
Despite the rule 14a-8 mechanism for shareholder input, al-
most all proposals made under the rule fail to carry the requisite
number of shareholder votes for adoption. Failure of the share-
holder-input mechanism reinforces the proposition that sharehold-
ers are not interested in controlling corporate operations. The
great likelihood is that the individual shareholder, like the large
institutional holder, will sell his shares when he becomes dissatis-
fied with the performance of the corporation. The real voting pro-
cess occurs in the marketplace, not in director elections or in de-
bates over policy questions submitted by shareholders.
51. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1619-28 (1978) [herein-
after cited as Corporate Director's Guidebook].
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1983).
53. Rule 14a-8(c) provides that an issuer may omit a shareholder proposal, for example:
(1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper
subject for action by security holders;
(4) If the proposal relates to the enforcement of a personal claim or the
redress of a personal grievance against the issuer, or any other person;
(5) If the proposal deals with a matter that is not significantly related to
the issuer's business.
SEC Rule 14a-8(c)(1), (4), (5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (c)(1), (4), (5) (1983). The SEC recently
proposed amendments to rule 14a-8. See 48 Fed. Reg. 38,222 (1983) (proposed Aug. 23,
1983).
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B. Fiduciary Duty Standards
Federal disclosure regulations provide extremely important
and effective protection of shareholder voting rights in contested
director elections, in shareholder votes on fundamental changes in
the corporation (such as a sale of assets or a merger), and in other
circumstances affecting shareholders' fundamental economic inter-
ests in the corporation. Nevertheless, because of inertia or disinter-
est, shareholders usually do not control the voting process, and, as
noted above, state law prevents them from exercising control over
day-to-day operations. No substantial gap in regulation occurs,
however, because an extensive body of state and federal law im-
poses fiduciary obligations upon corporate officers and directors in
managing the corporation. Although the ALI Reporters apparently
believe that the law of corporate fiduciary relations needs major
revision, an examination of the current law in this area indicates
that major changes are unnecessary.
C. Duty of Care
1. MODEL ACT SECTION 35
All states treat the obligations of corporate directors as fiduci-
ary in nature. The corporate director owes both a duty of care and
a duty of loyalty to the corporation and to the shareholders.
Section 35 of the Model Act articulates the director's obliga-
tion to act with care:
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including
his duties as a member of any committee of the board upon
which he may serve, in good faith, in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with
such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would use under similar circumstances.5
2. GOOD FAITH
The duty of care standard requires the director to act in good
faith.55 If a director engages in a conflict-of-interest transaction, he
will be unable to meet the good faith requirement of section 35.
54. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1979); see also Exposure Draft, supra note 9, §
8.30(a).
55. Primarily, it is state law that regulates the duty of care; federal regulation focuses





Under the duty of care standard, a director acting in good
faith must exercise diligence concerning corporate affairs. The
duty of diligence requires him to participate in meetings of the
board and of board committees, to be informed about the corpora-
tion, and to monitor delegated activities. 6 The diligence require-
ment derives from the rule that a director should use "such care as
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances. ' 57 Litigation brought to recover damages
from directors who have failed to exercise adequate diligence has
been the primary method of enforcing the duty of care standard.5 8
Section 35 of the Model Act deals with the diligence question
as it relates to the duty to become informed by providing affirma-
tively that a director may rely upon others with respect to infor-
mation. Section 35 states:
In performing his duties, a director shall be entitled to rely on
information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial
statements and other financial data, in each case prepared or
presented by:
(a) one or more officers or employees of the corporation
whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and compe-
tent in the matters presented,
(b) counsel, public accountants or other persons as to mat-
ters which the director reasonably believes to be within such
person's professional or expert competence, or
(c) a committee of the board upon which he does not
serve, duly designated in accordance with a provision of the arti-
cles of incorporation or the by-laws, as to matters within its des-
ignated authority, which committee the director reasonably be-
lieves to merit confidence,
but he shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he
has knowledge concerning the matter in question that would
cause such reliance to be unwarranted. A person who so per-
forms his duties shall have no liability by reason of being or hav-
ing been a director of the corporation."
56. Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 51, at 1602-03 (discussing directors'
duty of attention).
57. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1979); see also Exposure Draft, supra note 9, §
8.30(a)(2).
58. Although few cases on duty of care exist, liability for failure to exercise diligence is
regarded as well established. See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
59. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1979); see also Exposure Draft, supra note 9, §
8.30(b).
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The Model Act provides a safe harbor against claims of lack of
diligence to directors acting in good faith who rely on information
from the articulated sources. At the same time, however, section 35
of the Model Act indirectly emphasizes that directors must be in-
formed about corporate affairs. 60 The requirements that directors
pay attention to their duties and become informed protect share-
holders by inducing directors to gather adequate knowledge before
making business decisions.
4. BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Also encompassed within the duty of care standard is a protec-
tion for directors when they make business judgments. As the state
system of corporate governance has developed, state courts uni-
formly have decided that directors should be able to take risks for
the corporation without fearing that their judgments will be ques-
tioned later."' Under the business judgment rule, if a director is
diligent in the performance of his duties, becomes fully informed,
and acts in good faith, he may make a poor or unreasonable deci-
sion (but not an extremely bad decision) without being subject to
liability.
The policy behind the business judgment approach seems
sound. The main purpose of the corporate form is to pursue prof-
its. Holding corporate directors liable for business losses resulting
from mistakes made in good faith in the pursuit of profits would
stifle business initiative.
Two other factors support the logic of the business judgment
rule. First, if a negligence standard were applied to directors' busi-
ness decisions, the activities of the directors in making these deci-
sions would frequently be judged in light of subsequent events un-
known to the directors at the time the original decisions were
made. Such after-the-fact evaluation would be unfair. Second, con-
stant litigation over the propriety of business decisions would force
judges and juries to make business decisions, a role for which they
60. Courts imposing liability in duty of care cases require that the director's lack of
diligence or failure to become informed be causally related to a measurable damage. See,
e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (finding a breach of duty, but declining
to impose liability because of failure to show a causal relation).
61. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) ("[t]hat doctrine bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate
directors taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legiti-
mate furtherance of corporate purposes").
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are not well suited.6 2
Finally, under current law the business judgment rule does not
entirely immunize directors' judgments. If a director acts reck-
lessly, or in a grossly irrational manner, his business judgment may
subject him to liability.
3
5. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS
A shareholder derivative suit is an action brought by a share-
holder on behalf of his corporation against third parties or against
officers or directors of the corporation. In recent years, many have
questioned whether the exercise of business judgment by a board
of directors acting in good faith should be sufficient to terminate
derivative litigation. Contrasting views have resulted, with New
York deciding the question in the affirmative,"' and Delaware per-
mitting judicial scrutiny of a board's good faith decisions.6
The ALI Reporters would extensively revise the law of deriva-
tive suits. 6 The furor over the suggested changes is great, and the
problem is too complex to address in this survey.
6. INDEMNIFICATION
Related to the operation of the business judgment rule is in-
62. Litigation over directors' business judgments occurs in several circumstances. For
example, the trustee in bankruptcy or the receiver of a defunct corporation inevitably seeks
to find assets for the creditors of the corporation. The trustee may bring suit against the
former directors alleging poor business judgment. Another example is the derivative suit. A
disgruntled shareholder may sue the board of directors, alleging that business judgment has
been poor. In both cases, the motivation of the party bringing suit is to recover damages
from the directors.
63. The ALI Reporters use the phrase "had a rational basis" to describe the non-egre-
gious decision. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 4.01(d). Section 4.01, in articulating
the business judgment rule, provides:
(d) A corporate director or officer shall not be subject to liability under the
duty of care standards. . . with respect to the consequences of a business judg-
ment if he:
(1) informed himself and made reasonable inquiry with respect to the bus-
iness judgment;
(2) acted in good faith and without a disabling conflict of interest; and
(3) had a rational basis for the business judgment.
Id. (emphasis added). This articulation provides less protection for directors than do other
articulations of the business judgment rule.
64. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
65. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The ALI Reporters
adopted the view of the Zapata court. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 7.03
comment a, at 304.
66. For the derivative suit provisions, see Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, §§ 7.01-
.08 (§ 7.08 is not included in this draft).
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demnification for corporate officers and directors. The principle of
indemnification is that if a director acts in good faith on behalf of
the corporation, he should not be subject to liability to third par-
ties, and he should not be required to bear litigation expenses in-
curred in successful defense of suits brought against him because
of his status as a director. The Delaware General Corporation Law
gives a corporation the power to indemnify any officer or director
"if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed
to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. ' '67
These indemnification provisions are consistent with the busi-
ness judgment rule. A director protected against liability for mak-
ing an error in business judgment should not be subject to an indi-
rect form of liability by paying litigation expenses or third party
claims.
7. COMMITTEES
Most large corporations have established committees of direc-
tors to help their boards discharge their responsibilities. These
committees have two key functions. The first function is to assist
in both the short-range and long-range operation of the company.
The committees carrying out this function may include the long-
range or strategic-planning committee, the public-policy commit-
tee, the finance committee, and the executive committee. The ex-
ecutive committee will also be responsible for performing the tasks
of the board of directors when the board is not in session. The
second function of board committees is to provide independent
judgment on transactions by or with officers and directors. The
committees established to carry out the latter function normally
are the audit committee and the compensation committee, with
the nominating committee providing independent review of the
nominating process.68
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), (b) (1983); see also MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT §
5(a), (b) (1979) (same language as quoted); Exposure Draft, supra note 9, § 8.51(a) (similar
language). In 1980, § 5 of the Model Act was amended, see Committee on Corporate Laws,
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of Corporate Personnel, 36 Bus. LAW. 99 (1980),
to remove ambiguities in the section and to resolve certain questions regarding the specific
implementation of indemnification procedures. Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section
of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act Affecting Indemnification of Corporate Personnel, 34 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1595 (1979).
68. For a discussion of the audit, compensation, and nominating committees, see Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, The
Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 35 Bus. LAW. 1335 (1980) [hereinafter cited
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Section 42 of the Model Act is illustrative of the power pro-
vided by statute for the creation of board committees, especially
the executive committee. The authorizing legislation permits a
committee to "exercise all the authority of the board of directors,"
with certain articulated exceptions. 9 The board normally entrusts
decisionmaking authority of that magnitude only to the executive
committee, not to other board committees.
The official comment on the amendments to Model Act sec-
tion 42 suggests that a noncommittee director attempting to meet
the standard of care set out in section 35 of the Model Act should
use care in delegating matters to a committee and in surveillance
of the activities of a committee exercising responsibilities: 70 "Care
in delegation and surveillance would include appraisal of the capa-
bilities and diligence of the committee directors in light of the sub-
ject and its relative importance, and would be facilitated, in the
usual case, by review of minutes and receipt of other reports con-
cerning committee activities."'
8. EVALUATION OF THE DUTY OF CARE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE
The duty of care standard requires directors and officers to act
in good faith, use diligence in attending to corporate affairs, and
take reasonable steps to inform themselves fully when making bus-
iness decisions. Fulfillment of these duties permits directors and
officers to make business judgments free from fear of liability when
their judgments prove to be erroneous, unless their judgments are
poor enough to be treated as gross derelictions of duty. Bad busi-
ness judgments will expose officers to termination by the board
and will subject members of the board to sanctions in the form of
defeat by shareholders in elections. Shareholders who are unable to
as Commitee on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees]; see also Corporate Director's
Guidebook, supra note 51, at 1625-27.
The existence of board committees is important to good business practice. Committees
can assist the full board of directors in establishing compensation, in reviewing the perform-
ance of the chief executive officer and other officers of the corporation, in reviewing the
corporation's financial disclosures, in planning long- and short-range strategy, in reviewing
the corporation's compliance with various laws, in anticipating the corporation's impact
upon society, and in assisting in the efficient operation of the corporation.
69. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 42 (1979); see also Exposure Draft, supra note 9, §
8.25.
70. Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501, 512 (1975).
71. Id.
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influence elections are likely to sell their shares, causing fluctua-
tions in stock prices that will be likely to have the same effect as
changing management through the voting process. 2
The legal standards governing the conduct of directors and of-
ficers acting in good faith permit the corporation to function well
in its primary activity-business. The duty of directors and officers
to be diligent and to obtain knowledge regarding the corporation
should lead to good management. Any suggestion that directors
should be held to a duty of care higher than the standard of the
existing business judgment rule misses the point. The imposition
of liability for bad business judgments would inevitably cause di-
rectors to refrain from making risky decisions. If directors do not
take risks, business initiative will be stifled. No state or federal in-
tervention is needed in the duty of care area.
D. Conflict-of-Interest Transactions Involving Directors and
Officers
The foregoing discussion has examined the principles applica-
ble to conduct by officers and directors who act in good faith. Dif-
ferent principles apply when the action of an officer or director
lacks good faith. The Corporate Director's Guidebook explains:
By assuming his office, the corporate director commits alle-
giance to the enterprise and acknowledges that the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders must prevail over any
individual interest of his own. The basic principle to be observed
is that the director should not use his corporate position to
make a personal profit or gain other personal advantage.
78
Conflict-of-interest transactions will subject an officer or direc-
tor to liability. An officer or director may not steal or embezzle
from his corporation. He may not use the corporation for personal
benefit,74 he may not use corporate funds and facilities to develop
a product that would increase his own personal profit, 7 and he
may not use the corporate mechanism to purchase or issue stock
for the purpose of perpetuating his controlling group in office.7 6
72. Bad management may also turn a corporation into an attractive takeover target.
73. Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 51, at 1599.
74. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
75. See id.
76. Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 25, 187 A.2d 405, 411 (Del. 1962). In a parent-
subsidiary relationship, the parent may not use its dominant position to the detriment of




Another doctrine, related to conflict-of-interest principles,
bars a director or officer from taking an opportunity belbnging to
his corporation. Under the "corporate opportunity" doctrine, a di-
rector who receives information about a favorable business oppor-
tunity because of his relationship to the corporation must first of-
fer the opportunity to the corporation. Only after a disinterested
decision by the corporation to refuse the opportunity may the di-
rector pursue the matter for his own account."
Executive compensation also may be an area of conflict of in-
terest. Modern corporate practice has resulted in high compensa-
tion at the senior management level. Responding to charges that
extravagant executive compensation bears no relation to executive
performance, many corporations have established a system for in-
dependent review of executive compensation. Most corporations
use a compensation committee composed exclusively of indepen-
dent, nonmanagement directors.s
In lawsuits challenging director transactions with the corpora-
tion, the burden of demonstrating the fairness of the transaction is
usually placed on the director. If he meets this burden, the trans-
action will not be set aside. 9
Modern corporate theory accepts the notion that an indepen-
dent majority of directors or shareholders, acting in good faith,
may authorize or ratify directors' and officers' transactions with
their corporation and thereby eliminate problems associated with
participation of the director and the officer on the corporate side of
the transaction. Both the Delaware General Corporation Law80 and
the Model Act 8 reflect this theory. Both statutes provide that if
there is independent approval, a contract or transaction between a
corporation and a director or officer will not be void or voidable
solely because the director or officer has been present at, or partici-
pated in, the meeting of the board authorizing the contract or be-
77. See Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 51, at 1600.
78. See Committee on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees, supra note 68, at
1347-51.
79. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del.
1952). The rule that allows directors to justify a transaction with the corporation by showing
the transaction's fairness is more favorable to directors than was the rule's legal predecessor.
The prior rule was that every contract between a director and his corporation was voidable
without regard to fairness. See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and
Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36-39 (1966).
80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983).
81. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 41 (1979); see also Exposure Draft, supra note 9, §
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cause his votes contributed to the board's approval.8 2 Independent
approval requires disclosure of material facts and a good faith vote
either by a majority of the disinterested directors or by a majority
of the shareholders. Underlying these statutes is the policy that an
officer or director may provide a benefit to his corporation by en-
tering into a contract with it.
At least in Delaware this approach still leaves open the ques-
tion of fairness. The Delaware rule provides that when the share-
holders or an independent majority of directors have approved a
contract with a director or officer, the burden of showing unfair-
ness shifts to the person attempting to set aside the contract.83
Thus, disinterested approval has two effects. First, it overcomes
the presumption that the contract in which the director has a
financial interest is void or voidable. Second, it causes the burden
of proof to shift back to the party alleging the unfairness.
A key point in analyzing conflicts of interest involving direc-
tors is the concept of independence. The most usual approach is
that a director will be independent only when he has no financial
interest in a transaction involving his corporation. The interest
may be direct, or it may arise indirectly from a family, corporate,
business, or professional relationship."
The theory that independent directors can protect the corpo-
ration and its shareholders from overreaching by management is
extremely important. Independent directors may protect the cor-
poration and its shareholders by acting either as an independent
majority of the board or as members of board committees estab-
lished to deal with conflict situations.5
Although state regulation of director and officer conflict-of-in-
terest transactions is well-developed, a detailed federal system has
not emerged. This lack of federal regulation does not mean that
existing protections are inadequate. State law provides a good
blend of protecting the corporation against these conflicts of inter-
est, while at the same time making it possible for the corporation
to benefit from good faith transactions with directors and officers.
82. The Delaware statute applies to corporate-opportunity transactions by both direc-
tors and officers; the Model Act provision applies to directors' transactions only.
83. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962); Schiff v. RKO Pic-
tures Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 329, 336, 104 A.2d 267, 271 (1954).
84. The ALI Reporters use the term "significant relationship" in defining the indepen-
dence of directors. See supra note 3. The Reporters' expansive definition of the term has
given rise to considerable controversy.
85. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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E. Overreaching in Securities Transactions
Under both federal and state laws, protection exists for share-
holders when they sell securities to or purchase securities from of-
ficers, directors, or controlling shareholders." Officers and direc-
tors of the corporation, as well as persons able to elect the majority
of the corporation's board, control assets owned by all sharehold-
ers, and as such they occupy positions of trust and confidence.
The corporate officer, director, or majority shareholder may
not act in an arms-length manner with shareholders. One of the
frequently cited statements of the fiduciary principle is that of
Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon:
87
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As
to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate.88
Special doctrines have developed under both federal and state
laws to govern insider purchases and sales of securities made with-
out adequate disclosure.8 Under state law, corporate officers and
directors breach a fiduciary duty to disclose when they purchase
shares from shareholders without disclosing material corporate in-
formation available to them as insiders.90 The federal doctrine re-
lating to insider trading adopts the theory that officers, directors,
and controlling shareholders have the obligation not to engage in
securities transactions with shareholders without disclosing mate-
rial corporate information,"' and extends that obligation also to
other persons having access to information available only for cor-
porate purposes."e The federal doctrine of insider trading is en-
86. Both federal and state laws condemn misrepresentations made in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 661-62 (1963). The law requires no
special status or fiduciary obligation for the shareholder to receive judicial relief. Id.
87. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
88. Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546, quoted in Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d
Cir. 1955).
89. See Ruder, supra note 86, at 661-62.
90. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16
P.2d 531 (1932); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
91. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3260 (1983).
92. Id. at 3263; ChiareUa v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
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forced under SEC rule 10b-5,9 3 and has been subject to extensive
interpretation.94
An additional area of concern is the question whether majority
shareholders may sell a controlling interest in a corporation at a
premium price without sharing that premium with minority share-
holders. Although the prevailing doctrine allows consummation of
the sale without such sharing, the doctrine is subject to several im-
portant exceptions. If a sale of a controlling block of stock is ac-
companied by looting of the corporation," prospective looting,9 6
sale of corporate office,9 7 or misuse of corporate office,98 liability
may be imposed upon the selling shareholders. Although the ma-
jority shareholders may sell their shares to third parties at a pre-
mium over current market prices, they may not do so if the trans-
action injures the corporation or the minority shareholders.
Fiduciary duty doctrines apply also to overreaching by con-
trolling shareholders in transactions involving fundamental
changes in the corporate structure. In reorganizations, mergers,
sales of assets, and related transactions, shareholders in control of
a corporation have the opportunity to force unfair transactions
upon minority shareholders. These transactions usually involve
purchases or sales of securities, and frequently invoke both federal
and state law doctrines condemning misrepresentation and
nondisclosure. 9
Some observers have characterized the United States Supreme
Court decision in Santa Fe Industries v. Green'00 as an indication
of a reduced federal interest in protecting minority shareholders in
corporate transactions. In the Santa Fe case the parent corpora-
tion in a short-form merger forced allegedly unfair merger terms
upon minority shareholders of its subsidiary. The Supreme Court
(1969).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
94. Rule 10b-5 interpretations are discussed thoroughly in 1-5 A. BROMBERG & L. Low-
ENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD (1983); 5-5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND
PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 (rev. ed. 1983); 5B A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 (rev.
ed. 1980).
95. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
96. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
97. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427,
91 A. 428 (1914).
98. Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969).
99. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd as
modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). For a compilation of Speed-litigation-related cases,
see Ruder, supra note 86, at 688-89 app.
100. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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held that since the merger terms had been revealed to the minority
shareholders, no claim was stated under rule 10b-5. It held that
mere breach of a fiduciary duty was not enough, stating that rule
10b-5 required either deceptive or manipulative conduct. The Su-
preme Court's decision was less a philosophical change in the pro-
tection of shareholders than an effort by the Supreme Court to re-
main faithful to statutory language. The federal securities law
continues to provide substantial protection of shareholders in cases
involving misrepresentation and nondisclosure in securities
transactions.101
Federal regulation in cases involving fully disclosed overreach-
ing is desirable, but is probably not needed because state law pro-
vides adequate remedies. For instance, the Delaware courts require
majority shareholders dealing with minority shareholders in a cor-
porate transaction to show fairness to the minority.'10 This Dela-
ware position is typical of the law of other states to the effect that
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary ob-
ligation to minority shareholders in major corporate transactions.
Appraisal or dissenters' rights also protect shareholders when
there is a fundamental change in the corporation. Under state law,
shareholders dissenting from certain corporate actions have the
right to have their shares appraised and to obtain payment in cash
from the corporation.'0s In 1978, an amendment of the Model Act
clarified this right.'"4 As amended, section 80 entitles shareholders
to dissent and obtain payment in the event of certain corporate
actions: 1) a plan of merger or consolidation; 2) a sale or exchange
of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets; 3) a plan of ex-
change involving acquisition of the corporation's shares; 4) an
101. The question of whether the United States Supreme Court is turning away from
protecting minority shareholders may be answered if the Court ever decides a case factually
similar to one that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided in
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). In
Goldberg, a parent corporation failed to disclose to the minority shareholders of its subsidi-
ary the unfairness of a transaction. The Second Circuit distinguished Santa Fe, positing
that the parent's failure to disclose its overreaching provided the element of deception re-
quired in a rule 10b-5 action.
102. See Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). For other Delaware cases in-
volving fairness, see Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. Interna-
tional Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Najjar v. Roland Int'l Corp., 387 A.2d 709
(Del. Ch. 1979); Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978); Kemp v. Angel, 381
A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1978), which are discussed in Seminar on Delaware Corporation Law
and Some Federal Considerations, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651 (1979).
103. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983).
104. See Conard, Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissent-
ers' Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80, and 81), 33 Bus. LAw. 2587 (1978).
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amendment of the articles of incorporation materially and ad-
versely affecting the shares of the dissenting shareholders in cer-
tain ways; and 5) corporate action in which a shareholder or board
resolution directs that dissenting shareholders shall have the right
to obtain payment for the shares. 105 The theory underlying ap-
praisal and dissenters' rights is that a shareholder who disapproves
of change in the basic characteristics of his corporation should
have the opportunity to object and to receive fair payment for his
shares.
The appraisal remedy is not without flaws: Compliance with
the prerequisites for appraisal is sometimes difficult and questions
exist concerning the fairness of the valuation of the shareholders'
securities under the appraisal procedures. 106 Nevertheless, the ap-
praisal remedy fulfills an important function by giving sharehold-
ers the right to have their shares appraised and to receive cash
payment when they object to a corporate action involving funda-
mental change.
V. THE Focus OF FEDERAL LAW
This article has focused on state law regulation of corporate
internal affairs in the United States, and has also noted that fed-
eral securities laws protect shareholders through proxy rules,
mandatory financial disclosures, and antifraud rules applicable to
securities transactions.
The disclosure system of the federal securities laws also has
important effects on corporations. The Securities Act of 1933 re-
quires extensive disclosure when corporations distribute securities
to the public." 7 The Exchange Act imposes comprehensive annual
and periodic reporting requirements on moderate- and large-sized
105. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 80 (1979); see also Exposure Draft, supra note 9, §
13.02.
106. Section 81 of the Model Act defines "fair value" of the securities as "their value
immediately before the effectuation of the corporate actipn to which the dissenter objects,
excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of such corporate action unless
such exclusion would be inequitable." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 81(a)(3) (1979); see also
Exposure Draft, supra note 9, § 13.01(3). The 1978 amendment added the phrase "unless
such exclusion would be inequitable" to provide for consideration of value that existed in
the corporation, but was not recognized by the market. According to Professor Conard, au-
thor of the comments to the 1978 Model Act amendments, "[t]he exception is inserted to
deal with 'squeeze out' situations in which the dissenter is excluded against his will from
continued participation in the altered enterprise, by some method such as a 'cash merger.'"
Conard, supra note 104, at 2600-01.
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
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companies 0 8 and also requires reports of beneficial ownership of
securities.10 9 Federal securities legislation dealing with corporate
tender offers contains disclosure provisions " designed to give in-
formation to the shareholders about the identity, purposes, and re-
sources of persons obtaining five percent of the corporation's
shares or making tender offers.
The federal securities laws also regulate corporate conduct di-
rectly, through other means unrelated to disclosure. The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977"' prohibits domestic corporations
from bribing foreign officials or other persons in the furtherance of
business abroad. It requires corporations to keep books and
records "accurately and fairly" reflecting corporate transactions,
including the disposition of a corporation's assets. The tender offer
legislation regulates tender offers made for corporate shares."'
Section 16(b),11 3 the short-swing profit section of the Exchange
Act, prevents insiders from profiting on purchases and sales of
shares within a six-month period.
Despite this imposing array of federal securities laws affecting
corporations, officers, and directors, the federal securities laws do
not focus on the regulation of corporate internal affairs. Regulation
of internal corporate affairs is incidental to the regulation of the
securities markets.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article's description of state and federal laws regulating
corporate internal affairs provides a background for consideration
of the question whether new state or federal regulation of corpora-
tions is necessary. The inquiry should be whether this state and
federal corporate law provides adequate regulation. Those seeking
change should bear the burden of proving the inadequacy of ex-
isting regulation.
As noted earlier, a perceived need to force corporations to fol-
low desirable social policies is not proper justification for govern-
mental intervention pursued at the expense of short- or long-range
profits. A plan of corporate regulation motivated by concern for
social policy is laden with regulatory problems and would cause a
108. See supra notes 28-29, 41 and accompanying text.
109. Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
110. Id. §§ 13(d), 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1982).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982).
112. Exchange Act §§ 13(d), (e), 14(d), (f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (M (1982).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
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major shift in the corporate structure in the United States.
Proper analysis of the ALI corporate governance project
should question whether the ALI Reporters are correct in their
perception that corporations and shareholders need increased pro-
tections. 11 4 The conclusion reached here, after examination of the
current combined state and federal regulatory system, is that ex-
tensive changes in the regulation of corporate internal affairs are
not necessary. The present system strikes a proper balance be-
tween facilitating corporate business decisions without undue in-
terference and protecting corporations and minority shareholders
against injury by officers, directors, and controlling shareholders.
114. The power to cause major shifts in corporate activity already exists within the
federal securities law system, particularly through accounting policies, disclosure regula-
tions, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, proxy rules, antifraud rules, and the rules of the
stock exchanges and other self-regulatory agencies. See Ruder, Corporate Governance: An
Analysis of Duties, Attacks, and Responses, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 741, 750 (1979).
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